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		22 APR 1986
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1. OIT/MD		
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8041-102

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Prescribed by GSA

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17 APR 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, FDIA Staff

VIA: Deputy Director of Security (PTS)
NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence
Activities25X1 FROM:
Information Systems Security Division, OS25X1 SUBJECT: Security of Agency Personal Computer
Diskettes REFERENCE: Memo for DD/PTS/OS & DD/OIT-M fm C/FDIA Staff,
dtd 20 Mar 86, Subject: Protection of Agency
PC Diskettes

1. This office appreciates your concern for the security of Agency personal computers, including controlling their magnetic storage media (diskettes). We also appreciate your candor regarding the difficulty in obtaining appropriate security advice and guidance and regret that the DI ADP Control Officers did not suggest that you contact this office. Through our computer security awareness programs and briefings, we are attempting to have Information Systems Security Division (ISSD) become a "household" name in computer security; unfortunately as is evident by your memorandum, we have not, as yet, been able to reach all the masses.

2. Your office certainly exercised good security judgment in not permitting the diskettes in question to be returned to the vendor. Returning magnetic media to uncontrolled environments is covered (specifically on page 2, section 8) in our "Security Procedures for Personal Computers," which have been disseminated to all Agency ADP Control Officers. I am attaching a copy for your future reference.

3. ISSD is in the process of publishing a "Personal Computer Security-Quick Reference Guide." This document will be unclassified and is intended to be used on the desk top to provide instant guidance for situations similar to what you recently encountered. Controlling magnetic storage media is


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one of Security's major areas of concern. We are actively pursuing ways in which to control the media, including procedural inventory control systems and encrypting the data stored on diskettes. We are also planning to brief all Agency ADP Control Officers on a number of computer security issues to provide them with a better base from which to draw when giving security guidance.

4. I appreciate your bringing the difficulty you encountered in receiving appropriate security guidance to my attention. It is through this type of feedback that we are able to measure the effectiveness of our program and take steps to improve communications with our customers.

Attachment



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20 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Physical and Technical Security/OS ✓
Deputy Director for Management/OIT

THROUGH : NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities

FROM :
Chief, FDIA Staff

SUBJECT : Protection of Agency PC Diskettes

1. We are in the process of upgrading our PC data base software, DBaseIII to DBase Plus. Ashton-Tate, like other software houses, for copyright reasons requires the return of one version of software (program diskettes) before they will provide updates. To comply with various Agency regulations that require that all magnetic media remain on Agency premises we requested and received from Ashton-Tate an exception to the requirement; a letter certifying destruction will suffice.

2. Our reason for bringing this to your attention is the wide range of advice--much of it wrong--that we received from several different Agency PC users as we sought guidance on how to update our software. A few advised us to go ahead and return the diskettes. Others told us to use our own judgment. Two DI office ADP control officers told us their PC users were "on their own" with regard to all aspects of PCs, including security.

3. Knowing that the number of Agency PCs and users is rapidly increasing as are the updates to the many and varied software packages being used, and that the security education level appears to be low, we are concerned that users may take the path of least resistance and exchange diskettes despite the regulations. In our view, a management and control system is necessary as a supplement to existing regulations to maximize protection of classified information that may be on software diskettes. We feel one should be developed requiring control of all software and data diskettes combined with a periodic inventory by operating components (conceptually, a control system equivalent to those in use for SCI documents).

4. We understand that OIT plans to open a "software store" sometime this year. With a requirement that all PC software be acquired thru and only thru the store, combined with a requirement that unique control numbers be assigned and an inventory record maintained there, the Agency could take a major step forward in gaining control over this all important security area. Subsequent, periodic inventories could be conducted the way they currently are for top secret documents.

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